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THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, 
PARTISAN, PRESIDENT. By Noah Feldman.1 Random 
House. 2017. Pp. xviii + 777. $35.00 (Cloth). 
Calvin H. Johnson2 
Professor Noah Feldman of Harvard Law School has a new 
biography of Madison, Three Lives of James Madison: Genius, 
Partisan, President, which helpfully condenses some 33,000 pages 
of Madison’s papers into single literate 777-page narrative. 
Madison had an extraordinarily interesting life, all three of them. 
Feldman’s biography is short of a full and accurate, critical 
biography because Feldman does not get into the sources beyond 
Madison’s papers. When Madison is wrong in fact or policy, 
Feldman has no fulcrum from outside sources to evaluate it. 
When Madison errs, Feldman cannot see the error. Feldman also 
gives Madison credit for arguments that were in fact well 
established, without Madison, and before Madison turned and 
accepted them. On the enumerated power doctrine, for example, 
Madison is not only not original, but also wrong. From a path that 
follows Madison’s papers, Feldman becomes an apologist for 
Madison, when we need more skepticism. 
The most extraordinary aspect of Madison’s life story is his 
turn from being an advocate, indeed the primary cause, of a strong 
 
 1. Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
 2. John T. Kipp Chair, University of Texas Law School. The author wishes to thank 
Joey Fishkin and Sandy Levinson for very helpful comments to a prior draft. Many of the 
conclusions in this review were reached first, in some form or other, in CALVIN H. 
JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005) [hereinafter JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER]. If an 
argument is repeated, it is because nothing has happened in the interim to alter its merit 
and because the point bears repeating. 
  Letters are cited here by the name of the writer and recipient without repeatedly 
stating that this is a letter. Speeches at the state ratification convention cite to the 
ratification convention without mentioning it is a speech. First names of most prominent 
founders are dropped in footnote citations. 
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national government, over to a Jeffersonian partisan trying to 
keep the national government within a newly-created narrow 
corral. That turn, that denial of his creation, is the focus of this 
essay. Madison’s denial of his magnificent prior creation, a 
constitution that created a strong national government, where 
none existed beforehand, is important enough to our history that 
we need to understand it. A full and accurate critical biography of 
Madison would at least try to help us digest Madison’s first and 
most important turn. 
Historical arguments, even those looking quite abstract and 
philosophical, are best explained in context, as an attempt to 
accomplish or defeat some specific set of programs.3 Madison’s 
turn to form an opposition party against Hamilton and the 
Washington Administration occurred, we can see, over three 
specific issues, that are, in chronological order, redeeming federal 
notes at their full promised value rather than their depleted fair 
market value, national assumption of the state war debts, and 
creation of bank notes to serve as paper money. On all three 
issues, Hamilton is clearly right and Madison and Jefferson are 
wrong. 
Feldman treats the Bill of Rights as Madison’s first incident 
of his second, anti-national life. There is no turn or inconsistency 
there, however. Madison is a consistent member of the 
Revolutionary generation, which fought a long, hard war for the 
fundamental rights of Englishmen, even when they ceased to want 
to be Englishmen. Madison is a consistent defender of individual 
rights. Madison is not, however, sympathetic to the package of 
hobbles on the national government that the Anti-Federalists 
were offering under the label of their “Bill of Rights,” nor to Anti-
Federalists’ use of minor rights as an excuse to defeat the new 
national government as a whole. It is not the protection of rights 
that Madison is objecting to, but the impairment of the national 
power. 
It may well be that Feldman might want to push back and 
defend Madison on some of these controversies. Madison might 
be more ably defended in his move to his second life than I 
conclude here. Still, Feldman is by style glib, giving conclusions 
 
 3. See, e.g., QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 3 
(2002) (saying that we need to “situate the texts we study within such intellectual contexts 
as enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in writing them”). 
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without weighing evidence, especially evidence from outside 
Madison’s papers. Joseph Story, quoted in Feldman’s front piece, 
stated that “I wish someone who was perfectly fitted for the task, 
would write a full and accurate biography of Madison.” To satisfy 
Story’s call, we need a critical review that draws on all the 
available outside evidence and cares to evaluate the positions. 
James Madison is first the efficient cause of the Constitution. 
The Constitutional movement started in the Virginia legislature 
arising out of Madison’s attempt from 1784–87 to get the national 
war debt paid and in reaction to the dominance and policies of 
Patrick Henry.4 In March of 1787, only Madison thought the 
confederation mode of government, a friendship league among 
sovereign states, could and should be replaced with a strong 
national government able to walk on its own legs.5 Plausibly only 
Hamilton joined Madison in thinking that the confederation 
should be replaced.6 By early May 1787, however, Madison had 
convinced the Virginia delegation to the Philadelphia convention 
to adopt the aggressively centralizing Virginia Plan7 and by the 
end of May, he had convinced the Philadelphia Convention as a 
whole8 to adopt the core of the Virginia plan, a strong three-part 
 
 4. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 2, at 51–60 makes the case, but it 
depends on NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS: 1781–1800, at 126 (1978) 
(arguing that the merger of the issues of payment of the war debt and British creditors’ 
access to Virginia courts turned Virginia politics from personality-based coalitions to 
organized parties). 
 5. See, e.g., Madison to Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 383 (William J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter JM] (calling for due 
supremacy of the national authority because the “individual independence of the [s]tates 
is utterly irreconcileable [sic] with their aggregate sovereignty”); cf. Washington to 
Madison, Mar. 31, 1787, in JM, supra note 5, vol. 9, at 342 (saying that “the only 
Constitutional mode by which the defects can be remedied” is within the revision of the 
confederal system). 
 6. Hamilton to James Duane (NY delegate to Continental Congress) (Sept. 3, 
1780), in 2 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400–20 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961–87) 
[hereinafter PAH] (calling for Congress to have power to tax and power over internal 
police). 
 7. Virginia Plan, (May 29, 1787), in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 20–22 (Max Farrand ed., 1907) [hereinafter FARRAND] (calling for national 
government with power over “common defence, security of liberty and general welfare”); 
see, e.g., Gordon S. Woods, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 WM & MARY 
Q. 628, 633 (1987) (calling the Virginia Plan breathtaking in novel espousal of a strong 
central government). 
 8. Resolution of May 30, 1787, in FARRAND, supra note 7, at 35 (stating that a 
national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislature Executive 
& Judiciary with power over common defense, security of liberty and general welfare) 
(passing six states to one). 
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national government. By June of 1788, the Constitution had been 
ratified by enough states that the new national government could 
be established. Once the national government began operations, 
opposition to the Constitution ceased to be a viable political 
position.9 Madison pushed the whole cascade. 
Madison wanted an even stronger national government than 
he got in the Constitution. He wanted a national veto on state law 
in any case whatsoever, and the Convention would not let him 
have that. Still, what he got was a three-part national government 
able to raise taxes on its own to maintain payments on the war 
debts, to provide for the common defense and general welfare, 
able to nationalize the state militias, and able to enact laws that 
would be paramount over state laws and constitutions. He shifted 
the United States from a meeting house of diplomats into a single 
nation. 
Madison’s Federalist 10, moreover, is the most interesting 
systematic argument in favor of the new Constitution. Federalist 
10 was proof that the new national government would better 
protect fundamental individual rights than had the states. The 
Episcopalians might abuse the Presbyterians and Baptists in 
Virginia, as they had. Congregationalists might abuse Baptists and 
Quakers in Massachusetts, as they did. Presbyterians and Quakers 
might abuse each other when each was in office in Pennsylvania. 
But on the national level, no one sect could obtain a majority, and 
every sect and faction would be at perfect liberty to follow their 
own conscience.10 Only the new national government, the 
extended republic, could protect the fundamental rights for which 
the Revolutionary War had been fought. 
For generations of political scientists, moreover, Federalist 10 
was the invisible hand for political science, parallel to Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand for economics. Federalist 10 proved that a 
special interest might prevail unjustly in an individual instance, 
but that over time, the law of large numbers would ensure that the 
 
 9. See, e.g., Washington to Catherine Macauley Graham (Jan. 9, 1790), in 30 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 495, 497 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931–44) 
[hereinafter GW] (finding it a miracle that there was such unanimity); Jefferson to 
Lafayette (Apr. 2, 1790), in 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 293 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 
1950) [hereinafter TJ] (saying “[t]he opposition to our new constitution has almost totally 
disappeared.”). 
 10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 352 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter 
FEDERALIST] (saying a free government must give security to civil rights as well as 
religious rights). 
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special interests would offset each other. All that was needed was 
an extended republic with large enough numbers and the machine 
would run of itself.11 
Having accomplished his strong national government, 
Madison denied it, so to speak, three times before the cock 
crowed.12 By 1791, less than four years after Federalist 10, 
Madison had become Jefferson’s lieutenant in the endeavor to 
defeat the administration of Washington and Hamilton, foremost 
and irretrievably on the issue of use of national bank notes as 
paper money. In a series of pseudonymous essays written in 
service of Jefferson’s party, Madison called, among other things, 
for small ideologically homogeneous states, like Virginia, to be a 
check upon the national government.13 For Jefferson, the states 
were the “surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies.”14 
The ideological stance had a specific programmatic purpose: 
defeat of the national bank. The Jefferson-Madison opposition 
party was created, moreover, within a polity in which it was not 
yet clear that organized factions were a good thing nor that 
opposition could be either loyal or legitimate. 
Madison in his first life is a strong, consistent nationalist. 
Madison’s Virginia Plan gave the new national government power 
over “common defence, security of liberty, and the general 
welfare” without further limitation.15 In the 1787 convention, 
Madison had argued that it was in the states, “the small 
communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, 
could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader, 
in trampling on the rights of the Minor party.”16 Patrick Henry is 
the factious leader described by Madison’s more abstract words. 
As Madison had to explain to Jefferson, when Jefferson first 
returned to America, “[t]he evils suffered and feared from 
weakness in Government . . . have turned the attention more 
 
 11. See, e.g., DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 59 
(1984) (calling Federalist 10 “the most famous and highly regarded essay . . . perhaps even 
of all American political writings”); see also praise collected in Larry D. Kramer, 
Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 612–13 (1999). 
 12. Matthew 26:75 (King James). 
 13. National Gazette (Sept. 1791, Nov. 1791), in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 68, 
81, 114 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900–1910). 
 14. Jefferson, 1st Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 334 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944). 
 15. Virginia Plan, supra note 7. 
 16. Madison, Notes on his Speech on the Right of Suffrage to the Philadelphia 
Convention, in 3 FARRAND, supra note 7, at 454. 
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towards the means of strengthening the [national government] 
then of narrowing [it].”17 The complaint was not that Congress 
“governed overmuch,” as James Wilson put it, but that they 
governed too little.18 But by 1791 Madison was trying to narrow 
the national government for the purpose of defeating Alexander 
Hamilton’s programs of assumption of the state war debts, 
payment of war debts at the face amount rather than depreciated 
value of the debt, and, most of all, of creation of bank debt to 
serve as paper money. 
Madison transformed yet again into a war president willing 
to override local interests, but that flip is less interesting. In the 
election that Jefferson justly called the Revolution of 1800, 
Jefferson and Madison became the victorious establishment that 
controlled the national government. A major issue for most of the 
duration of both the Jefferson and Madison administrations was 
trying to get the French or British belligerents in the Napoleonic 
wars to respect the United States’ rights of shipping as a neutral. 
Neither belligerent would allow U.S. shipping to supply their 
enemy. Ultimately, Madison declared the War of 1812, 
unnecessarily: Britain was willing to make concessions that should 
have avoided the war. The United States was grievously 
unprepared for war on land or on sea.19  
Jefferson and Madison sponsored a broad embargo which 
destroyed New England shipping, and that was an exercise of 
national power against a smaller community. An administration 
that sincerely believed that the New England States were the 
surest bulwark against anti-republican tendencies would not have 
done that.  
The second turning of Madison is, however, less serious than 
the first and may not even be an inconsistency. Even in his 
sharpest states’ rights mode, Jefferson was willing to concede that 
the national government would have responsibility for war and 
the common defense.20 It was the ability of the national 
 
 17. Madison to Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in TJ, supra note 9, at 150. 
 18. James Wilson, Federal Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, supra note 7, 
at 10. 
 19. This paragraph draws primarily from DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, 
THE WAR OF 1812, at 1–15 (2002). 
 20. Jefferson to Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in JM, supra note 5, at 210, 211 (saying that 
the proper division between the general and state governments is that national government 
would have power over foreign concerns and the states would have power over the 
domestic ones); Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Aug. 13, 1800), in 9 WORKS OF THOMAS 
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government to serve the general welfare that Jefferson had 
trouble with.21 
Madison had a spectacularly interesting life, all three of 
them. By the measure of political success, all three of Madison’s 
lives were highly successful. By the end of the Madison first life, 
the Anti-Federalist opposition was politically extinct. By the end 
of his Presidential term, the Federalist Party, like the Anti-
Federalists before it, was politically extinct. 
Feldman’s book is exciting because Madison’s life was 
exciting. Madison defends his positions articulately. Still, Feldman 
does not question Madison’s positions, even when they need some 
critical appraisal. 
I. MADISON ERRS 
A. FALSE CLAIMS 
 Madison makes errors, as mortals do, which Feldman should 
correct. In debate on September 4, 1789, for example, Congress 
seemed set on locating the permanent capital on the Susquehanna 
River in Pennsylvania and Madison wanted it along the Potomac 
next to Virginia. Madison told Congress that if a prophet had 
predicted the Susquehanna location to the Virginia Ratification 
convention, the convention might not have ratified the 
Constitution (p. 278). 
The claim is implausible. In the original debates in Virginia 
in June 1788, the Anti-Federalists treated proximity to the federal 
seat of government as a NIMBY—not in my backyard—issue. 
The ten-mile square for the federal capital, the Anti-Federalist 
maintained, would be the refuge for slaves,22 a sanctuary for the 
 
JEFFERSON 138, 140 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter WTJ] (saying that the 
true theory is that “states are independent as to everything within themselves” and 
“general government [is] reduced to foreign concerns only”). 
 21. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 6, 1817), in WTJ, supra note 
20, at 70, 71–72 (saying that the tenet that Congress has only the power to provide for 
enumerated powers, and not for the general welfare,” is almost the only landmark which 
now divides the federalists from the republicans”). 
 22. John Taylor of Caroline (June 17, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTIONS OF 
THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 454–455 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1907) [hereinafter ELLIOT]; William Grayson, Virginia Ratification 
Convention (June 16, 1788), in ELLIOT, supra, at 434 (saying that “persons bound to labor” 
would escape to the district). 
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blackest crimes,23 and the place to prosecute the honest editors 
without a jury.24 As the Nation expanded to the South, Anti-
Federalist Grayson warned, [cue here for eerie music] the “ten 
miles square may approach us!”25 Virginia Federalists, by way of 
reassurance, said that Benjamin Franklin had recommended far-
off Philadelphia as the seat of government.26 In that context, it is 
highly unlikely that any promise of a capital on the Potomac could 
have been implied or understood. Madison might be allowed 
some rhetorical flourish in 1789—it is a little misremembrance or 
at worse a little fib. Madison might be remembering only his 
attitude toward the ten-mile square, and not the tone of the 
opposition. Still, Feldman should have called him on it. Feldman’s 
sources are Madison’s papers, so Feldman could not spot the 
misdescription. Feldman also has no fulcrum from outside 
Madison to correct him on this or more serious issues. 
B.  NOT INVENTED HERE.   
Feldman treats judicial review and the enumerated power 
doctrine as originated by Madison when they had in fact been 
well-articulated by others earlier, although outside the Madison 
papers.  Both ideas were inconsistent with what Madison was 
saying when the ideas first appeared in the public debates. 
1. Judicial Review 
Feldman, for example, calls a Madison speech of June 8, 
1789, in connection with the debate over the bill of rights, the first 
time Madison “or possibly anyone—had ever made the argument 
that the written bill of rights would transform judges into 
protectors of fundamental liberties” (p. 293, emphasis added).27 
 
 23. George Mason, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 16, 1788), in ELLIOT, 
supra note 22, at 431 (saying the federal district would become “the sanctuary of the 
blackest crimes”); John Tyler, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 1788), in 
ELLIOT, supra note 22, at 455 (saying perpetrators of acts of violence would take sanctuary 
in the ten miles square). 
 24. Mason, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 16, 1788), in ELLIOT, supra note 
22, at 431. 
 25. William Grayson, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 12, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1192 (Merrill 
Jensen et. al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter DOCU HISTORY]. 
 26. A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the Proposed Plan of Government (Apr. 
2, 1788), in 9 DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 674. 
 27. Citing James Madison, Second Speech of June 8, 1789, in JM, supra note 5, at 
203. 
6 - JOHNSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:33 PM 
2019] BOOK REVIEW 201 
 
That misstates the originality of the claim: The Constitution 
before the Bill of Rights already protected critical individual 
rights, including the right to a jury trial in criminal cases and 
prohibition against retroactive laws and bills of attainder.28 The 
supremacy clause of the Constitution, prior to the Bill of Rights, 
had already provided that the U.S. Constitution, including the 
requirement of jury trial and prohibition of retroactive bills of 
attainder, would be the supreme law of the land and that the 
judges would be bound by it.29 Prakash and Yoo list eight pre-
constitution state cases in which the state courts had already held 
rights were paramount over state legislation, including as to bills 
of attainder and trial by jury.30 Judicial review to protect 
individual rights listed in the Constitution was already established 
by the text of the Constitution before Madison’s June 8, 1789 
speech. 
Madison was a late convert to the judicial review remedy, 
resisting it in favor of his preferred remedy, a congressional veto 
of state law, in any case whatsoever. Both Governor Morris and 
Thomas Jefferson had tried to convince Madison that judicial 
review, striking down state laws inconsistent with the Constitution 
after enactment, was a sufficient remedy in lieu of Madison’s 
deeply-felt proposal for a national pre-effective negative.31 
Madison at the Convention and beyond had wanted a national 
veto, a negative on any state law in any case whatsoever before it 
went into effect.32 
Contrast, for example, Alexander Hamilton, as Publius, who 
is clearly in favor of judicial review, with Madison who fails to 
mention it when one would think it should be mentioned. 
Hamilton’s Federalist 78 defended judicial review that would 
strike down legislation inconsistent with the “superior 
obligations” of the Constitution. Madison, as Publius, by contrast, 
in Federalist 37, seems to rely on a struggle between the people, 
terminated only by compromise, to settle the vague border 
between national and state authority. If Madison expected the 
Courts to rein in the federal government, Federalist 37 would have 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 30. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 887, 933 (2003). 
 31. Jefferson to Madison (June 20, 1787), in 11 TJ, supra note 9, at 480–81. 
 32. See, e.g., JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 2, at 109–16 (discussing 
Madison’s “immoderate” fight for the negative). 
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been the appropriate place to mention it. Instead, Federalist 37 
assumes a vague border between national and state scope, 
enforced by politics and too vague for judicial review or 
enforcement. When Madison does come around to endorsing 
judicial review in June 1789, he is two years too late for the 
argument to be treated as novel. 
2. Enumerated Power Doctrine 
  Similarly, Feldman gives Madison credit for the argument 
that Congress’s jurisdiction is limited to enumerated powers. The 
best evidence is that the limitation was made up out of whole cloth 
only after the ink on the Constitutional text was dry, but not by 
Madison. 
In Federalist 41, first published in January 19, 1788, Madison 
argued that the list of powers enumerated by clauses 2–18 of 
Article I were the “clear and precise” expressions of 
Congressional power, and that the more general language in 
clause 1, that Congress would have the power to tax to provide for 
the common defense and general welfare, was limited by the more 
“precise expressions.”33 “This is the embryo—still undeveloped, 
to be sure,” Feldman claims, “of a narrow construction of 
Congress’s enumerated powers” (p. 204). 
The argument for a limitation to enumerated powers arose 
before Madison took it up, and at a time when Madison was still 
committed to a more general jurisdiction for his national 
government. In October 1787, shortly after the convention broke 
up, in a speech in front of Philadelphia Independence Hall where 
the convention had taken place, James Wilson argued that the 
states had plenary powers, but the federal government did not: 
“[T]he congressional authority is to be collected, not from tacit 
implication,” he said, “but from the positive grant expressed in 
the” proposed Constitution. The states, he argued, could have 
powers not mentioned in any document. For the federal 
government, however, “every[]thing which is not reserved is 
given.”34 Also before Madison, Charles Pinckney told the South 
 
 33. FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 10, at 277 (James Madison); see also FEDERALIST 
NO. 45, supra note 10, at 313 (James Madison), which is more famous and better expressed: 
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few 
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and 
indefinite.” 
 34. James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 13 
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Carolina House that in the federal government, “no powers could 
be executed, or assumed, but such as were expressly delegated.”35  
Madison himself was extraordinarily soft on the limitations 
of his national government when Wilson made his claim. In his 
first explanation of the newly framed Constitution to Jefferson in 
far off Paris on October 24, 1787, Madison had said there would 
be “a continual struggle” between the national head and the state 
inferior members, “until a final victory has been gained in some 
instances by one, in others, by the other of them.”36 Neither the 
local nor the general government would entirely yield to the 
other, he wrote in Federalist 37 (January 11, 1788), “and 
consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by 
compromise.”37 The national government would prevail, 
Federalist No. 46 (January 29, 1788), only by offering “manifest 
and irresistible proofs of a better administration.”38 Madison is 
sounding like Hamilton who wrote, in Federalist No. 31 (January 
1, 1788), that it would be a “vague and fallible” conjecture as to 
where politics would set the line between national and state.39 
When Wilson first claimed that the Congress had only listed 
powers in October 1787, Madison was still considering the 
document to give a general power over national welfare, with the 
actual border between national and state to be worked out by 
politics, not by courts. 
The best evidence is that neither the text nor the drafting 
history of the Constitution supports the enumerated power limi-
tation. Thomas Jefferson, reading the sacred text in far off Paris, 
dismissed the argument: 
To say, as Mr. Wilson does that . . . all is reserved in the case of 
the general government which is not given . . . might do for the 
Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, 
opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, 
as well as from the omission of the clause of our present 
 
DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 339; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: 
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 143–46 (1996) (describing 
the importance of Wilson’s speech within the entire ratification process). 
 35. Charles Pinkney, Speech to the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 
16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT, supra note 22, at 259 (emphasis added). 
 36. Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 JM, supra note 5, at 205, 210–11. 
 37. FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 10, at 237 (James Madison). 
 38. FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 10, at 317 (James Madison). 
 39. FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 10, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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confederation [Article II] which had declared that in express 
terms.40 
Article II of the Articles Confederation had provided that 
Congress would only have the powers “expressly delegated” to it, 
and the framers took the limitation out because it had proved 
“destructive” to the Union.41 
The Anti-Federalists were devastating as to Wilson’s claim. 
“Let us compare” Wilson’s claim that all powers not granted are 
reserved, said a Republican in New York, “with the sense of the 
framers, as expressed in the instrument itself.”42 In his first essay, 
Brutus labeled Wilson’s argument that all which is not given is 
reserved as “rather specious than solid.”43 “The 
powers . . . granted to the general government by this 
constitution,” Brutus said, are “complete.”44 “If this [enumerated 
powers] doctrine is true,” said “A Democratic Federalist” in 
Pennsylvania, “it ought at least to have been clearly expressed in 
the plan of government.”45 Arthur Lee wrote in Virginia that “Mr. 
Wilson[‘]s sophism has no weight with me when he declares . . . 
that in this Constitution we retain all that we do not give up, 
because I cannot observe upon what foundation he has rested this 
curious observation.”46 If the Framers promised a limitation of the 
federal government to a list of narrow powers, they did not do so 
in the writing of the Constitution. 
The enumerated power limitation, however, ultimately 
prevailed.  Jefferson would later maintain that the tenet that 
Congress had only the power to provide for enumerated powers, 
and not for the general welfare, is “almost the only landmark that 
divides the federalists from the republicans.”47 Jefferson was 
elected President in 1800 and his views prevailed.  Supreme Court 
doctrine adopted the enumerated power doctrine with a 
sufficiently generous penumbra from the necessary and proper 
 
 40. Jefferson to Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 TJ, supra note 9, at 438, 440. 
 41. Edmund Randolph, Virginia Convention, ELLIOT, supra note note 22, at 600–01. 
 42. A Republican I: To James Wilson, Esquire, NEW YORK J. (Oct. 25, 1787), in 13 
DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 477, 478. 
 43. Brutus II (Nov. 1, 1787), in 13 DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 524, 526. 
 44. Id. 
 45. A Democratic Federalist, PENNSYLVANIA HERALD (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 
13 DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 386, 387. 
 46. George Lee Tuberville to Arthur Lee (Oct 28, 1787), in 13 DOCU HISTORY, supra 
note 25, at 505, 506. 
 47.   See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 6, 1817), in 12 WTJ, supra 
note 20, at 70, 71–72. 
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clause to allow a bank. In 1813, the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
declared the enumerated power limitation to be triumphant, but 
he simultaneously allowed the necessary and proper clause, at the 
end of the article I, section 8 list of powers, to justify a national 
bank.48 By 1813, the Federalists were on the wane, on the way to 
extinction as a party, and the Jeffersonian Party was dominant, 
including on the Court. Marshall, a last survivor of the Federalist 
Party, was giving the Jeffersonians the enumerated power 
limitation while simultaneously in the Court’s holding allowing 
the bank that was the first program-target of the enumerated 
power doctrine.   
I have argued before49 and will argue again, that the 
enumerated power doctrine arose in the ratification debate 
without foundation in the text. If the Constitution is like the Holy 
Bible binding in its text, it is the text that is binding and not the 
Concordances. Here, however, it is sufficient to say that Madison 
was not the source of the enumerated power doctrine, 
notwithstanding Feldman’s giving him credit.  
 
II.  WHY MADISON FLIPPED 
Madison at the start of the Washington Administration was 
Washington’s chief lieutenant, but he went in opposition to the 
Administration in service of or in alliance with Thomas Jefferson.  
Political arguments, even those sounding the most abstract and 
eternal, should always be understood in the context of the time 
they were made as an attempt to accomplish or defeat some set of 
programs.50 Madison’s switch is in reaction to specific programs 
offered by Alexander Hamilton and endorsed by Washington: 
paper money, assumption of state war debts, and payment of 
debts at face value.51 Feldman describes the controversies from 
what Madison says about them, but without a critical stance or 
description of the other, Hamiltonian side of the issue. Feldman 
relates that he is pained that his daughter depicts Hamilton as her 
 
 48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 49. Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 25 (2005). 
 50. See, e.g., SKINNER, supra note 3, at 3. 
 51. John Zvesper, The Madisonian Systems, 37 W. POL. Q. 236, 249–50 (1984) 
(emphasizing contrast of Madison before and after break with Hamilton). 
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favorite musical (p. 630). Still, Feldman’s daughter’s choice seems 
fully justified. Consistently, Alexander Hamilton is right on the 
merits of the programs that caused the shift, and Madison and 
Jefferson are cleanly wrong. 
A.  PAPER MONEY 
In 1791, Hamilton proposed a national bank that would issue 
bank notes that would increase the supply of money. The country 
needed paper money. If there is not enough money in circulation 
to effect trades, then sellers are able to sell their wheat or their 
cloth only by barter or by extending credit. Barter requires a rare 
event, a double coincidence of finding someone who has 
something the seller wants who also wants the seller’s wheat or 
cloth. Extending credit is relying on the hope that the buyer will 
be able to pay later. Sales to strangers that would get done if a 
reliable currency were available do not get done. A government 
can then increase the long-run wealth of the nation if it will ensure 
an adequate enough supply of money to allow the trades 
demanded by economic activity without barter.52 
In the shared mercantilist diagnosis of the times, the ills of 
the economy were said to be caused by excessive imports that had 
drained gold and silver coinage from the country and left too little 
to enable the domestic trades. Anti-Federalist John Lansing 
opened the Anti-Federalist opposition at the New York 
Ratification Convention with a fine mercantilist diagnosis, that 
the current economic woes were caused by “imported European 
goods to an amount far beyond our ability to pay.”53 From the 
Federalist side, James Wilson argued that we needed to replace 
the Articles of Confederation, because we could not restrict the 
“excessive importations which lately deluged the country”54 
George Washington put it pungently that imports were “luxury, 
effeminacy, & corruption.”55 Madison had joined in the attack 
 
 52. Charles W. Calomiris, Institutional Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the 
Depreciation of the Continental, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 47, 48–49 (1988); Hamilton, Report on 
a National Bank (Dec. 13, 1790), in 7 PAH, supra note 6, at 305, 311, 320, 321 (saying 
without money trades would be reduced to barter). 
 53. John Lansing, New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT, 
supra note 22, at 218. 
 54. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 
FARRAND, supra note 7, at 141. 
 55. See, e.g., George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 298, 299–300 (W.W. Abbot ed., 
6 - JOHNSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:33 PM 
2019] BOOK REVIEW 207 
 
describing imports as “draining us of our metals,” so as to furnish 
“pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money.”56 
Fiat paper money, issued by the sovereign and made legal 
tender as a matter of law, works, but only if the sovereign re-
absorbs by taxation the currency in excess of what is needed for 
trades.57 In the Revolutionary War, the intended system was that 
Congress could issue Continental Dollars to buy war goods and 
pay soldiers and the states would pull the excess dollars out of 
circulation by taxation by their usual mode.58 The states, however, 
were unwilling to tax by enough to keep the dollars in circulation 
within the needs of the trade, although the states had the taxable 
capacity to carry more taxation. The Continental Dollar had thus 
first inflated and then failed in full to be acceptable as payment.59 
With the failure of the Continental Dollar, and the 
withdrawal of the state paper moneys, the country needed a 
substitute paper money. Hamilton attributed the decrease in 
value of land to the scarcity of money.60 In Federalist 12, Hamilton 
argued that that greater volume and circulation of money would 
not only enable the domestic trades, but would also makes taxes 
easier to pay.61 Paper money would replace the precious metals 
sucked out to pay for machine-woven British cloth. 
Hamilton proposed a form of paper money, distinguishable 
from the Continental dollar, based upon debt of a bank that 
Congress would charter. In Hamilton’s system, bank notes would 
remain sound currency, whereas the Continental Dollar had 
failed, because a bank would be willing to issue its notes only for 
credit-worthy borrowers able to repay the bank.62 Under 
 
1994). 
 56. Madison to Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 JM, supra note 5, at 500, 501. 
 57. Calomiris, supra note 52, at 51 (citing, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 311 (Edwin Canaan ed., 1937). 
 58. Jefferson, Notes on Debates in the Continental Congress (July 29, 1775), in 2 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 220, 221 [hereinafter JCC] (reporting 
Congress resolving that “each colony provide ways and means to sink its proportion of the 
bills ordered to be emitted by this Congress, in . . . the usual mode of levying taxes in such 
colony”). 
 59. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 2, at 33–34 (describing the decline 
and fall of the Continental dollar). 
 60. See Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit (Jan. 
9, 1790), in 6 PAH, supra note 6, at 51, 72. 
 61. FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 10, at 73–75 (Hamilton). 
 62. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank (Dec. 12, 1791), in 7 PAH, supra note 6, at 
305, 322 (saying that bank notes were different from government paper money “bubble” 
because funds and demand for loan would limit the debt). 
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Hamilton’s system, a bank would issue its own notes but only as a 
loan to those who could be expected to repay with interest. The 
bank might, for example, issue $1000 in notes to a builder. The 
builder would use the notes to pay off workers and suppliers. The 
workers and suppliers would be entitled to redeem the notes from 
the bank in specie, but they would ordinarily not ask for 
redemption immediately, because the bank was a credible debtor 
who would pay whenever asked, and the notes were easier to 
carry and hide. The bank notes would circulate within the 
economy as money, indefinitely, so long as the bank would 
credibly redeem the notes on demand. A bank would issue the 
$1000, however, only because it expected to be repaid on the loan 
by the builder with interest. 
The bank needed a specific federal charter in the days before 
there was general law allowing formation of corporations, but it 
was essentially a private profit-making institution. Since the bank 
was trying to get repaid with interest to make a profit, the bank 
notes could not be expected to expand beyond the needs of 
economic activity of people willing to repay with interest nor to 
inflate nor fail as the continental dollar had.63 The bank could also 
issue bank notes usable as convenient paper money in return for 
deposits of gold or silver coins, but of course it was the shortage 
of coinage that made the paper money so necessary, and it was 
only the bank loans given out as bank notes that would expand 
the quantity of money. 
Jefferson and Madison did not understand Hamilton’s 
system, or at least did not understand it enough to distinguish it 
from the Continental Dollar or any other paper money. Jefferson 
thought Hamilton would “delug[e] the states with paper-
money.”64 Jefferson told Washington the bank was a “species of 
gambling, destructive of morality.”65 Madison joined Jefferson in 
 
 63. See, e.g., Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit 
(Jan. 9, 1790), in 6 PAH, supra note 6, at 51, 70–72 (arguing for public debt as a substitute 
for money). 
 64. Jefferson, Memoranda of Conversations with the President (Mar. 1, 1792), in 23 
TJ, supra note 9, at 184, 186; see also, Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill 
for Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 TJ, supra note 9, at 275, 278 (saying 
that Hamilton’s paper money was “clearly a demerit”); Jefferson to Edward Rutledge 
(Aug. 25, 1791), in 22 TJ, supra note 9, at 73, 74 (attributing economic ills to paper money). 
Later Jefferson would characterize bank notes as like a “South Seas bubble.” Jefferson to 
Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816), in 11 WTJ, supra note 20, at 493, 494. 
 65. Jefferson, Memoranda of Conversations with the President (Mar. 1, 1792), in TJ, 
supra note 9, vol. 23, at 184, 186. 
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opposing bank debt as a substitute for real money.66 Madison had 
previously argued that paper money was “a fictitious money,” 
which “feed[s] . . . the spirit of extravagance.”67 Paper money was 
an “unrighteous measure[]” by which the majority oppressed the 
minority.68 Paper money destroyed “that confidence between man 
& man.”69 “Nothing but evil springs from this imaginary money.”70 
Jefferson also played for keeps: Once the bank went into effect, 
Jefferson proposed that the Virginia Assembly make doing bank 
business treason, punishable by death.71 
On the merits of the issue, however, Hamilton’s bank notes 
costlessly fostered rational trades, and a Jefferson-Madison 
victory would have unnecessarily suppressed economic activity. 
Tight money also made existing debts harder to pay. For a 
yeoman farmer deeply in debt, the Jefferson-Madison tight 
money would have been very painful. As William Jennings Bryan 
would put it, much later, hard money would “crucify mankind 
upon a cross of gold.”72 Moreover, Madison’s alternative cure for 
the paucity of money, that is, suppress imports to preserve specie 
for domestic use, is a standard mercantile remedy, but that cure 
would cause unnecessary harm. As Adam Smith convinced the 
world, the wealth of a nation is improved by imports rather than 
by domestic hoarding of specie.73 
Charles Beard’s famous Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution interpreted Madison’s stance banning state paper 
money, adopted by Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, as the 
smoking gun that proved that the Constitution was written by 
economic elites to suppress the democratic aspirations of less elite 
 
 66. Madison, The Bank Bill, House of Representatives (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 JM, supra 
note 5, at 372, 373 (opposing bank debt as substitute for specie money). 
 67. Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9 JM, supra note 5, at 93, 95. 
 68. Madison to Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 JM, supra note 5, at 317, 318. 
 69. Madison, Notes for a Speech Opposing Paper Money, (Nov. 1, 1787), in 9 JM, 
supra note 5, at 158. 
 70. Madison to Jefferson (July 18, 1787), in 10 JM, supra note 5, at 105, 106. 
 71. Jefferson to Madison (Oct. 1, 1792), in 14 JM, supra note 5, at 375. 
 72. William Jennings Bryan, Cross of Gold, Speech at the Democratic Convention in 
Chicago (July 9, 1896). Charles Beard picked up Madison’s opposition to paper money as 
if the entire Constitution was written to crucify mankind upon a cross of gold. CHARLES 
A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 154, 324 (1913). 
 73. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (4th ed., 2015); the 
literature on the consensus that import restrictions reduce the wealth of this nation is very 
large. 
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classes.74 That interpretation has far more to do with William 
Jennings Bryan and the progressive movement of Beard’s times 
that it has to do with the constitutional period. Prohibitions on 
state paper money was not a contested issue in the constitutional 
debates. The Anti-Federalists joined in the “unanimous wish[]” 
that state paper money would be prohibited.75 “[P]aper money 
would be the bane of this country. I detest it,” Anti-Federalist 
Patrick Henry told the country.76 The ban on state paper money 
was no more controversial than the constitutional ban on titles of 
nobility. Notwithstanding the apparent “unanimity” against state 
paper, Hamilton bank debt notes were distinguishable from fiat 
money and served a real economic need. 
The public debate on bank notes as paper money largely took 
the form of a debate over scope of the national power. Madison 
took the position that there could be no national bank because a 
bank was not on the list of powers enumerated in Article I, section 
8.77 Hamilton took the position that section 8 gave the national 
government power to sponsor a national bank.78 
The Madison-Jefferson finding that the national government 
could not incorporate a bank to issue paper money is an especially 
constrictive interpretation of Congressional power, even 
assuming arguendo that Congress has no general power to 
provide for the general welfare. Madison had acquiesced in a 
national bank under the Articles of Confederation, which had not 
listed a bank within the powers expressly delegated,79 and 
Madison would acquiesce in a national bank again under his 
Presidency.80 The Congress also had the enumerated power to 
regulate commerce and surely the establishment of an adequate 
supply of sound nation-wide currency is an appropriate tool to 
foster trades within the national economy. In the nineteenth 
 
 74. BEARD, supra note 72, at 154, 324. 
 75. William Grayson, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 9, 1788), in 10 DOCU 
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 1447. 
 76. Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 9, 1788), in 9 DOCU 
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 1055. 
 77. Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 JM, supra note 5, at 372–82. 
 78. Opinion on the Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 PAH, supra note 6, at 97. 
 79. Madison to Pendleton (Jan. 8, 1782), in 4 JM, supra note 5, at 22, 23 (voting in 
favor as “acquiescing rather than an affirmative vote”); Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 
1791), in 13 JM, supra note 5, at 372, 375 (saying the Articles of Confederation bank was a 
“child of necessity,” not “justified by regular powers”). 
 80. Madison, To the Senate (Jan. 30, 1815), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: 
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 541 (Angela Kreider et al. eds., 2015). 
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century, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to 
print paper money, acceptable to pay tax and other debts as legal 
tender, as part of its powers to borrow and to coin money.81 Now 
our money is entirely federal bank notes, except for loose 
change.82 The Jefferson-Madison position that the scope of the 
national power did not reach bank notes seems first to be driven 
by their abhorrence of paper money of any kind. Once we 
conclude that Hamilton is right on the wisdom of bank-note paper 
money, and Jefferson-Madison wrong, the Jefferson-Madison 
position on scope of the Congressional powers does not look any 
better. 
B. ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBT 
The bank notes as money issue marked the unbridgeable rift 
between Jefferson-Madison and the Washington-Hamilton 
Administration, but two smaller schisms preceded it and 
contributed to the division: assumption of state debt and “scaling” 
of the purchase price of debt. Hamilton again had the better of 
the argument on the merits. 
Hamilton’s position was that the federal government should 
assume all the war debts and war expenses incurred by the states. 
All expenses of the war were expenses for the common defense 
even if incurred by the states rather than by the Congress: “The 
objects for which both [federal and state] debt were contracted, 
are in the main the same.”83 It was one war conducted under one 
banner of “United We Stand,” and for the same goal of 
independence from Britain. The goals of the various states did not 
vary. After the failure of the Continental Dollar, the states had 
stepped in to pay soldiers and suppliers, because Congress could 
not. The entire debt should be paid, Hamilton argued, by one 
general plan from one authority. Federal creditors should not be 
more favored than state creditors.84 Federal taxes should carry the 
whole. In the Philadelphia convention, John Rutledge of South 
Carolina had argued, like a true mercantilist economist, that the 
 
 81. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884) (upholding paper money without gold 
or silver backing as legal tender, under Congressional power to borrow and coin money). 
 82. Authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 411. 
 83. Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit (Jan. 9, 
1790), in 6 PAH, supra note 6, at 51, 81. 
 84. Id. at 78–79. 
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federal government should assume all the state debts because it 
had the best tax, a tax that would suppress imports.85 
Jefferson initially supported assumption of state debts 
because nine-tenths of the debts had been incurred for the general 
defense.86 In a compromise between Hamilton and Jefferson, 
Hamilton agreed to allow the capital to be placed along the 
Potomac and Jefferson agreed that the federal government would 
assume state debts. Jefferson no longer considered the capital to 
be a liability in the neighborhood, akin to a toxic waste dump. But 
Jefferson was later to say that his agreement to allow federal 
assumption of state debts was the biggest mistake of his political 
life.87 As Feldman accurately describes it, Madison was skeptical 
from the start about assumption and defeated assumption when it 
was first proposed (pp. 297-298).88 
The states were intensely jealous of disproportionate benefits 
going elsewhere and they did have widely varying amounts of debt 
that would be assumed. Assume, reasonably, that the burden of 
assumption would be paid by citizens of various states in 
proportion to the apparent wealth of the states.89 The various 
states had outstanding debts assumed that were widely 






 85. Motion at the Federal Convention (Aug. 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, supra note 7, 
at 327. 
 86. Jefferson to John Harvie, Jr. (July 25, 1790), in 17 TJ, supra note 9, at 270, 271. 
 87. Jefferson to Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), in 24 TJ, supra note 9, at 351, 352. 
 88. Madison, Assumption of the State Debts, House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 
1790), in 13 JM, supra note 5, at 80. 
 89. Population, counting slaves at three-fifths, was a compromise measure widely 
viewed as the best measure of the relative wealth of the states. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, 
Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 295, 300–04 (2004). The Framers, in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, set the 
allocation of votes of the various states in the House of Representatives based on their 
estimate of population, including three-fifths of slaves, before the first census results came 
in. 
 90. The estimates for disbursements are from the “Aug. 4, 1790 Act for Assumption 
of State Debt,” 1st Cong. 2d Sess., setting the maximum amounts of certificates per state. 
1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1044–45 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834–
56) [hereinafter ANNALS]. The estimates of wealth are the state population, counting 
slaves at three-fifths, from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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1 S.C. 5 8% 4,000 19% 2.5 
2 Mass. 8 12% 4,000 19% 1.5 
3 N.C. 5 8% 2,200 10% 1.4 
4 Conn. 5 8% 1,600 8% 1.0 
5 Va. 10 15% 3,200 15% 1.0 
6 Pa. 8 12% 2,200 10% 0.9 
7 R.I. 1 2% 200 1% 0.6 
8 N.Y. 6 9% 1,200 6% 0.6 
9 N.J. 4 6% 800 4% 0.6 
10 Del. 1 2% 200 1% 0.6 
11 Md. 6 9% 800 4% 0.4 
12 N.H. 3 5% 300 1% 0.3 
13 Ga. 3 5% 300 1% 0.3 
Totals: seats 67 100% 21,000 100% 1 
 
South Carolina and Massachusetts did much better by 
assumption than they bore of its costs. New Hampshire and 
Georgia did the worst in relation to taxable wealth. South 
Carolina did 2.5 times better in relation to its wealth, and Georgia 
and New Hampshire would receive benefit of only 30 percent of 
what they could expect to bear of the cost by reason of their 
wealth. Virginia, Madison and Jefferson’s home state, is right in 
the middle, receiving the same percentage of the total 
disbursements by assumption of state debts as Virginia wealth is 
to total wealth. It is plausible, however, that Madison and 
Jefferson did not know that. 
State debt is uneven because states paid more expenses when 
the fighting was local, and the fighting was not evenly divided 
geographically. The British abandoned New England after they 
evacuated Boston in 1776, and before then, the Congress was still 
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paying expenses with the Continental Dollar. States that had paid 
off their war debts also did so because they used the funds to 
redeem their debt instead of paying their supposedly mandatory 
federal requisitions or buying back Continentals as they were 
supposed to do.91 Still, whatever the distribution of benefits 
compared to wealth of the state, the federal government had the 
duty, as one Demosthenes Minor of [adversely affected] Georgia 
put it, “to discharge the debts contracted upon the collective faith 
of the states.”92 Hamilton had the better of the issue. 
C. SCALING 
Hamilton proposed that holders of the war debts, incurred at 
both congressional and state level, would be paid off at their 
promised face amount. Madison proposed instead what was called 
“scaling,” giving the current holders of the Congressional debt no 
more than the current fair market value of the debt. The 
“stockjobbers” and speculators who held the debt currently had 
paid a heavily discounted value to acquire the debt, sometimes 
only a trivial amount. Payment to them would give them a large 
profit, but not help original army suppliers or veterans. Madison 
would pay the current holders only the depreciated value of the 
debt, with the rest going back to the original holders, that is, the 
soldiers, suppliers, or lenders to whom the debt had first been 
issued.93 
Madison’s remedy would have been impossible to 
implement. The record of most debt was the certificate itself, 
there was no other public record of who first received a certificate, 
and no record of the price paid in the serial bargains between first 
and current possessor. Madison conceded the administrative 
difficulties.94 
 
 91. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 2, at 26 (reporting Governor Clinton 
of New York buying certificates from his supporters instead of paying requisitions). 
 92. Demosthenes Minor of Georgia, Gazette of the State of Georgia (Nov. 22, 1787), 
in 3 DOCU HISTORY, supra note 25, at 245. 
 93. Madison, Discrimination between Present and Original Holders of the Public 
Debt, House of Representatives (Feb. 11, 1790), in 13 JM, supra note 5, at 34–39. Compare, 
e.g., E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE 298 (1961) (calling Madison’s turn 
a purely political move, not realistic, but also the point at which Madison turned to state-
oriented politics, where before he had been a nationalist), with STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 16, 68, 139–45 (1995) (concluding that Madison 
was sincere in explaining his opposition as coming from being upset at paying the 
“stockjobbers” full value when they had paid so little to acquire the debt). 
 94. Madison, Discrimination between Present and Original Holders of the Public Debt 
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Paying buyers only fair market value would have also 
destroyed the possibility of finding any buyer of debt the next time 
out. The debt had depreciated because of very reasonable doubts 
that the Congress or the state issuers would pay the debt and fair 
interest any time soon. The only recourse the original holders of 
debt had to supply their current needs was speculators willing to 
gamble to make a profit. Take away their chance of receiving a 
profit and the buyers stop. Buyers of debt took risks even once 
they knew of Hamilton’s plans. The Congress led by Madison 
defeated assumption of state debts the first time it was offered.95 
Speculators who bet on the Continental, instead of debt 
certificates, lost out because Congress ultimately paid only one 
cent per Continental Dollar redeemed, whereas Hamilton had 
proposed redemption at two and a half cents per Dollar.96  
Moreover, “scaling” would allow the state or national 
borrower to reduce the amount they would have to repay of the 
amount borrowed just by increasing market doubts about their 
own willingness to pay. It was morally right, Hamilton concluded, 
that the issuers of the debt who had received full value should 
repay the debt according to what they had promised.97 Madison’s 
proposal lost in the House, 11-55, as it should have. 
Scaling was a wound to the relationship between Madison 
and the Washington-Hamilton Administration, but not yet the 
fatal blow. Hamilton later related that Madison’s position on 
scaling had diminished his respect for the force of Madison’s mind 
and the soundness of his judgment, but that his prior respect for 
the fairness of Madison’s character and reliance on Madison’s 
good will carried over, so that he thought that Madison was 
misguided but sincere. But then Madison began to cooperate with 
Jefferson, who seems to have viewed Hamilton as evil from the 
first meeting in their relationship.98 Then Madison became 
 
(Feb. 11, 1790), in 13 JM, supra note 5, at 34, 36 (saying that apportioning repayment was 
getting into “a labyrinth, for which it is impossible to find a clue”); id. at 55 (saying that 
splitting the redemption payments according to current market value was not “perfect 
justice”). 
 95. April 12, 1790, in 1 ANNALS, supra note 90, at 1577 (assumption of state debts 
defeated by 31-29). 
 96. FERGUSON, supra note 93. 
 97. Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit (Jan. 9, 
1790), in 6 PAH, supra note 6, at 73–74. 
 98. Forrest McDonald traces Jefferson’s uncompromising hatred of Hamilton to a 
dinner party at which Hamilton revealed his agreement with the “corruptions” by which 
Walpoleon party in England of 1730s accomplished its legislative agenda on behalf of the 
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“personally unfriendly” to Hamilton and dropped expressions in 
Hamilton’s presence, “sometimes without sufficient attention to 
delicacy.”99 Madison questioned Hamilton’s principles with 
asperity and the conversations got back to Hamilton.100 Perhaps 
the disagreement over scaling might have healed eventually, or 
been written off as private disagreement among strong allies who 
had together just won the Constitution. Still because of, or by the 
time of, the national bank, the Founders had split into two warring 
camps, never able to cooperate again. Madison disclaimed on the 
superiority of the small homogeneous state, as a part of what 
became a permanent Jeffersonian party. 
D.  IS THE BILL OF RIGHTS THE TRANSFORMATION? 
Feldman treats the Bill of Rights as the first step of Madison’s 
second life, as a Jefferson-Party anti-nationalist. Placing the Bill 
of Rights as the first day of Madison’s new life misstates 
Madison’s consistent commitment to fundamental rights, and 
misidentifies what the Anti-Federalist were trying to accomplish 
with what they called a Bill of Rights. 
Madison had opposed a Bill of Rights in the ratification 
debate, but he was the sponsor in the First Congress of the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution that became known as the 
Bill of Rights. Feldman treats the two positions as a change 
attributable to Madison’s campaign for a seat in the House of 
Representatives in the First Congress (pp. 252-254).101 Patrick 
Henry, who was Madison’s implacable foe in the decade before in 
the Virginia legislature, both caused the Virginia legislature to 
deny Madison appointment to the U.S. Senate by the Virginia 
legislature, and also put a formidable candidate, the future 
President James Monroe, up against Madison in Madison’s home 
district in the race for Congress in the first U.S. House of 
Representatives. In the election campaign, Madison promised the 
Presbyterian and Baptist constituents that since the Constitution 
 
Crown. Jefferson was a staunch believer in the country-gentry Bollingbroke opposition. 
FORREST MCDONALD, HAMILTON 212–17 (1979). By 1790s, the Walpole-Bollingbroke 
disputes were almost sixty years old, but it was apparently a festering wound. Id. 
 99. Hamilton to Edmund Carrington (May 26, 1792), in 11 PAH, supra note 6, at 426, 
428–29, 436. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Accord ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 
44, 46–49 (1987). 
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was now settled, Madison would offer amendments to protect the 
rights of conscience, freedom of the press, and trials by jury.102 
Madison does transform between his first and second life, but 
his stances on Bills of Rights are not an evidence of it. The “Bill 
of Rights” amendments offered by the Anti-Federalists in the 
ratification debate were very different from the Bill of Rights 
offered by Madison. Madison is consistent on protecting 
individual rights, and the Anti-Federalists are the lesser guardians 
of individual rights than is implied by placing the bill of rights as 
a first episode after transformative turn. It was not protection of 
rights that Madison objected to in the ratification debate, but the 
impairment of national power. 
Lansing and Yates, the Anti-Federalists delegates from New 
York, had set a standard for Anti-Federalism that “the leading 
feature of every amendment [to the Constitution that came out of 
Philadelphia] ought to be the preservation of the individual states 
in their uncontrolled constitutional rights.”103 In New York, only 
about twenty-five percent of the Anti-Federalist proposed 
amendments reflected ideas that were later incorporated in the 
Amendments I–X of the Constitution. The other three-quarters 
were restrictions on the power of the new national government, 
preventing tax on dry land, making it harder to borrow, and 
limiting the new government to only those powers expressly 
delegated to it.104 Rights are mostly states’ rights to the opponents 
of the Constitution, and Madison’s Bill of Rights protected not 
states but individuals. Madison, from his point of view, considered 
the various Bill of Rights amendments offered by the Anti-
Federalists as insincere, mere excuses to block the essence of the 
proposed national government,105 which is plausible in the context 
of the debate. 
The most important of the Anti-Federalists’ amendments 
was the proposal to prevent Congress from laying “direct” or dry 
land tax. Denying Congress the power to lay direct tax was 
considered “the point most dear to the opposition.”106 As Anti-
 
 102. Madison to [Baptist Minister] George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 JM, supra note 5, 
at 404–05. 
 103. Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., to N.Y. Governor George Clinton, DAILY 
ADVERTISER (New York) (Jan. 14, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT, supra note 22, at 481. 
 104. Calvin H. Johnson, “Impost Begat Convention”: Albany and New York Confront 
the Ratification of the Constitution, 80 ALB. L. REV. 1489, 1509–14 (2016). 
 105. Madison to Randolph (Apr. 10, 1788), in 11 JM, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 106. Tench Coxe to Madison (July 23, 1788), in 11 JM, supra note 5, at 194; see also 
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Federalist James Monroe put it, “to render the [Congress] ‘safe 
and proper,’ I would take from it one power only—I mean that of 
direct taxation.”107 For the Federalists, the prohibition on federal 
direct tax cut to the heart of the Constitution. As George 
Washington explained the Constitution to Thomas Jefferson in 
far off Paris: “For myself . . . there are scarcely any of the 
amendments . . . to which I have much objection, except that 
which goes to the prevention of direct taxation; and that, I 
presume, will be more strenuously advocated and insisted 
upon . . . than any other.” 108 For Washington, a federal direct tax 
was expected to “do justice to the public creditors and retrieve the 
[n]ational character. But [he said that] if no means [we]re to be 
employed but requisitions . . . [they] may as well recur to the old 
[c]onfederation.”109 For Washington, the purpose of the 
Constitution and the replacement of the confederation of 
sovereign states was to pay the war debts. The Anti-Federalist’s 
Bill-of-Rights prohibition on direct taxes would prevent the prime 
purpose. 
The Anti-Federalists considered Madison’s Bill of Rights 
protecting individuals to be “trivial and unimportant,” neglecting 
the more fundamental issues of structure of government.110 
Madison’s amendments were “good for nothing” and “will do 
more harm than benefit.” They “shall affect personal liberty 
alone,” the Anti-Federalists whined, “leaving the great points of 
the Judiciary & direct taxation [et]c. to stand as they are.”111 The 
Bill of Rights amendments, Anti-Federalists argued, were “not 
those solid and substantial amendments which the people expect; 
they are . . . frothy and full of wind.”112 Madison’s Bill of Rights 
were “a tub thrown out to whale” to divert the whale and “secure 
 
Madison to Randolph (Dec. 2, 1787), in 10 JM, supra note 5, at 289, 290 (direct tax is most 
popular topic among adversaries); Hardin Burnley to Madison (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 JM, 
supra note 5, at 460 (saying that direct tax prohibition is “chief object” of Anti-Federalists’ 
dispute). 
 107. Monroe, Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 DOCU HISTORY, supra note 
25, at 1109. 
 108. Washington to Jefferson (Aug. 31, 1788), in 30 GW, supra note 9, at 79, 82–83. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Abraham Yates, quoted in Staughton Lynd, Abraham Yates’s History of the 
Movement for the United States Constitution, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 223, 227 (1963). 
 111. William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 248–49, 
300 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). 
 112. Aug. 15, 1789, in 1 ANNALS, supra note 90, at 774. 
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the freight of the ship and its peaceable voyage.”113 George Mason 
had announced he opposed ratification in part because the 
Constitution lacked a bill of rights, but he was not mollified by this 
set. Madison’s amendments, Mason claimed, were a “Farce.”114 
The Virginia Anti-Federalists so hated Madison’s list that they 
defeated Virginia ratification of the Bill of Rights Amendments 
when it was first offered in Virginia in 1789.115 
Madison was not opposed to the protection of individual 
rights. In 1785, Madison had offered a constitution for the state of 
Kentucky that included a bill of rights preventing the legislature 
from meddling with religion, right to a jury, taking away habeas 
corpus, forcing a citizen to testify against himself, controlling the 
press, enacting retrospective laws, and seizing private property for 
public use without paying full value. The Bill of Rights that 
Madison proposed to Congress in 1789 has far stronger 
resemblance to his own 1785 list than to the Anti-Federalists’ lists, 
the latter so heavily leaning on restrictions on national power. 
Madison’s Federalist 10, moreover, is a proof that the extended 
republic, the new national government, would be a better 
protector of individual rights than the states had been. It was 
Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry who had been the abuser of the 
rights of dissenting religions (pp. 58-67). 
The Constitution without the Bill of Rights amendments 
already protected the essential right to jury in criminal law, and 
prohibited ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. Indeed, much 
of the enacted Bill of Rights is criminal procedure safeguards that 
are of secondary importance to the prime right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases. In his inauguration address in April 1789, 
President Washington recommended that the Constitution be 
amended to make certain that “the characteristic rights of 
freemen” might be “impregnably fortified.”116 Once the 
 
 113. Aedanus Burke, Gazette of the United States (Aug. 19, 1789), reprinted in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 175. 
 114. George Mason to John Mason (July 31, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
MASON 1162, 1164 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970); accord, Mason to Jefferson (Mar. 16, 
1790), in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra, at 1188, 1189 (saying that the 
Constitution was a “great [d]anger to the Rights & Liberties of our Country” even after 
the Bill of Rights). 
 115. RISJORD, supra note 4, at 356–57. The Bill of Rights Amendments were, 
however, ratified when the Virginia legislature revisited the issue in 1791. Id. 
 116. George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789). 
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Constitution was secured, Madison was willing to make changes, 
not impairing the national structure, in order to bring the two 
states, Rhode Island and North Carolina, which had not yet 
ratified, and, indeed, to convince the minority that the 
Constitution was as wise as the majority saw it.117 Washington and 
Madison, and indeed all Federalists, were members of the 
Revolutionary generation that had fought for independence in 
defense of the rights of Englishmen, even when they ceased to 
want to be Englishman. For Madison, the Bill of Rights is not a 
turn. 
One defect of the argument treating the Madison-Monroe 
congressional race as a trigger for the transformation is that the 
Bill of Rights is a misdirected remedy for the Virginia dissenting 
religions. Patrick Henry had sponsored tax assessments to support 
Christian teachers. Madison, in alliance with the Baptists and 
Presbyterians, had defeated the proposal.118 For Madison, it was 
Patrick Henry working within the smaller community of Virginia 
that posed the danger of state establishment of religion. The 
dissenting religions had reason to fear the State of Virginia, but 
on the Federal level, as Federalist 10 explained, no one sect had a 
majority by which it could oppress a competing sect. The First 
Amendment as passed, however, only limited the extended 
republic, Congress, from subsidizing religion and left Virginia free 
to abuse. 
E. SLAVERY 
While the increasing separation between Madison and 
Hamilton can be traced from minor fissure (scaling) to chasm 
(bank-note paper money), there is an unstated issue, slavery. 
Slavery is the elephant in the room, not mentioned specifically, 
but weighty. Slavery was for the South an increasingly intense 
reason for wanting to corral national power. Patrick Henry’s 
major platform in the Virginia Ratification Convention was the 
argument that “adopt this Constitution and the northern states 
can and will end slavery.” Allow them to lay direct taxes and the 
Congress will tax the slaves to manumission. Allow them power 
over commerce, and the Congress will prohibit slave trading. 
Allow them power over war and the Congress will draft slaves and 
 
 117. Madison, House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 1 ANNALS, supra note 90, 
at 448–49. 
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free them. Allow them power over the general welfare and the 
Congress will declare slavery against the general welfare and free 
them.119 Patrick Henry is right about the power of Congress, but 
wrong about the will of the Northern states to abolish slavery, at 
least for another seventy-four years. Jefferson and Madison are 
slaveholders from a slaveholder state. 
Slavery does not show up in Madison’s papers as a reason for 
moving to limit his powerful national government into a narrow 
corral. But then Washington is also a slaveholder and it is his 
administration that Jefferson and Madison are breaking from. 
The slavery chasm is not yet intense enough for war until the Civil 
War. Still, slavery has to be considered a major factor, indeed the 
predominant factor for any decision protecting states’ rights in the 
South even if not stated explicitly. 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
Professor Feldman performs a useful service by summarizing 
the 32,000 or so pages of the Madison papers into a fine narrative. 
All three of Madison’s lives are important to our national history. 
Still, Professor Feldman does not give a critical review or 
appraisal of Madison’s position, with a fulcrum for leverage from 
outside Madison’s papers. The focus of this review has been on 
Madison’s denial of the strong national government that Madison, 
foremost among others, created. 
Feldman gets the story of Madison’s denial wrong. Feldman 
treats the Bill of Rights as the first step in Madison’s turn from 
nationalist to anti-nationalist. Madison is, however, a consistent 
defender of the fundamental individual rights for which we had 
fought the War for Independence. Indeed Madison’s Federalist 10 
is a proof that the national government, the extended republic, 
will better protect individual rights than the states had done. 
Madison is not, however, sympathetic to the hobbles on the new 
national government, which were at the core of what Anti-
Federalist called a bill of rights. 
Historical arguments need to be understood as advocacy for 
or against a specific set of programs. Madison breaks with 
Hamilton and the Washington Administration, in partnership 
with Jefferson, over three specific issues: (1) “scaling,” which is 
 
 119. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 2, at 183 (collecting Patrick Henry’s 
and other southern Anti-Federalist arguments). 
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the proposal to pay for the war debts by paying only the 
depreciated value of the debts and not the amount originally 
promised, (2) assumption of state debts, and (3) bank notes as a 
form of paper currency. On the three issues, Hamilton was right 
and Madison and Jefferson were wrong. Slavery is probably the 
most important factor in pushing for restrictions on the national 
government, even if it is not stated as a factor by either Madison 
or Jefferson. Feldman describes Madison’s papers on the issues, 
but he is of no help in evaluating the arguments or assessing their 
historical meaning. 
Feldman also gives Madison credit for inventing judicial 
review to protect individual rights and for the argument that 
Congress has no general power to provide for the common 
defense and general welfare, and has only the powers listed in 
clause 2–18 of the article 1, section 8 descriptions of the national 
jurisdiction. Neither argument originates with Madison, and both 
are inconsistent with Madison’s thinking at the time they first 
arose. 
 
